

S-E-C-R-E-T

U.S.S. SUWANNEE (CVE-27)

ACTION REPORT - OKINAWA - PART VIII - COMMENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SECTION (B) - COMMENTS

The fuzing for 100-lb. G.P. on most missions flown from this carrier was .01-second-delay tail fuze. Since the present fuzing doctrine calls for many uses of the .01-second-delay and .025-second-delay primer detonators, it is recommended that 100% spares in these items be supplied as alternates.

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ACTION REPORT - OKINAWA

PART VIII - COMMENTS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION (C) - LESSONS LEARNED

The outstanding lesson learned from the Okinawa operation was the ability of the ship's company and the Air Group to operate effeciently for such a prolonged period of time as this operation covered. After seventy-seven consecutive days of flight operations in the combat theatre, practically all of them against enemy installations, the Air Group, while having lost something in efficiency, was still a very effective group. The flight deck crew, the rearming crews, and other supporting elements in the ship's company, while tired, were still maintaining a high degree of efficiency, considering the length of time they had operated under high pressure and constant threat of enemy attack. It is regretted that they cannot now be given a suitable period for rest and rehabilitation.

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SECTION (D) - RECOMMENDATIONS

1. IT IS RECOMMENDED:

(a) That the replacement program of aircraft be improved, both as to the ready availability of aircraft when required and as to the combat readiness of new aircraft when delivered.

(b) That the practice of deploying CVE's close to enemy installations and air bases, with almost complete lack of support, be modified to the extent that they be provided with adequate support, such support to be comparable to that given other task groups and forces so deployed.

(c) That in future operations, plans be made and facilities provided for the complete replenishment at sea of this class aircraft carrier.

It is considered completely feasible to take ammunition, bombs and, in fact, all necessary supplies from an oiler or supply ship while fueling; this is certainly preferable to the frequent trips into a crowded base under constant and recurrent threats of enemy attack, as was the case in the Kerama Retto during the operation just finished.